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JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to UCA 78-2a-3. 
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issues 
1. Did the district court abuse its discretion in not setting aside the default 
judgment? 
2. Did the district court err in relying on Appellee's testimony that 
immediately after the incident, Appellant admitted liability for the incident? 
3. Did the district court err in awarding damages in a medical malpractice 
action without a basis in expert evidence? 
Standards of Review 
The Motion to Set Aside should be reviewed on an abuse of discretion standard. 
However, the district court's discretion in rejection the motion to set aside is not as 
broad as its discretion in entering the default. Lund v Brown, 11 P.3d 277 (Utah 
2000)(citing 11 Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 2857, at 257-58 (2d ed. 
1995)). 
"To sustain a medical malpractice action, a plaintiff must demonstrate '(1) the 
standard of care by which the [physician's] conduct is to be measured, (2) breach of that 
standard by the [physician], (3) injury that was proximately caused by the physician's 
negligence, and (4) damages. . . . 'Because of the complex issues involved in a . . . 
medical malpractice case,' the plaintiff is required to prove the standard of care and 
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proximate cause through expert testimony." Sohm v. Dixie Eye Center, 166 P.3d 614, 
619 (Utah 2007). Findings of fact are reviewed on a clearly erroneous standard, while 
legal conclusions are reviewed for correctness, without deference to the district court. 
Wilson Supply, Inc. v. Fradan Mfg. Corp., 54 P.3d 1177, 1181 (Utah 2002). 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
UCA 78-14-18 
Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 60 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings 
The underlying case is a medical malpractice case. The Plaintiff brought the 
action against the defendants, including the Appellant, for damages purportedly arising 
from a laser hair removal incident. The Appellant denied the allegations in her original 
Answer. After the Answer was filed, and while the Appellant was represented by prior 
counsel, the Appellee issued discovery requests. Those discovery requests were not 
timely answered by the Appellant. The Appellant's prior counsel withdrew as counsel in 
August 2007. In August 2007, the court ruled that Appellant's prior counsel acted 
improperly and in violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct in failing to respond to 
discovery. The Appellant represented herself, pro se, from August to September 2007, 
when her Answer was stricken and default was entered due to the Appellant's failure to 
respond to outstanding discovery. After an evidentiary hearing, the Appellee was 
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awarded $66,213.07. The Appellant filed a Motion to Set Aside the Default and a 
IVtotion for a New Trial, which were rejected by the court. Thereafter, the Appellant 
filed the appeal. 
Statement of Facts 
1. The court issued a minute entry on August 29, 2007 finding that Appellant's prior 
counsel, at a minimum, violated the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct by 
failing to comply with the court's orders and rules (Rule 3.4(c)), failure to 
respond to discovery (Rule 3.4(d)), and engaging in conduct prejudicial to the 
administration of justice (Rule 8.4(d)). (Rec. 511) 
2. On September 21, 2007, after Appellant's prior counsel had withdrawn in August 
2007, and while Appellant was acting pro se, the court struck the Appellant's 
Answer for failure to cooperate with discovery, and entered the Appellant's 
default. (Rec. 516). 
3. An evidentiary hearing was held on January 14, 2008 to establish damages. (Rec. 
571). 
4. No expert testimony was submitted at the evidentiary hearing. (Rec. 644-649). 
5. On January 17, 2008, the court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Order explicitly relying on evidence of a conversation in which Appellant 
purportedly admitted liability to the Appellee. (Rec. 645). 
6. On February 5, 2008, entered an amendment to the final judgment. (Rec. 658-
660). 
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7. On February 19, 2008, the Appellant timely filed her Motion to Set Aside Default 
and Motion for New Trial. (Rec. 661-666). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The district court's rejection of the Appellant's Motion to Set Aside and Motion 
for a New Trial was an abuse of discretion. The Motion to Set Aside was timely filed, it 
provided reasonable justification for the failure to act which resulted in the default, and 
it established doubt as to the appropriateness of the default. The Motion to Set Aside 
showed that prior counsel improperly failed to respond to discovery, and also violated 
three separate rules of professional conduct. At the time the default was entered, not 
only was the Appellant representing herself pro se, but the merits of the case had yet to 
be heard. Additionally, the district court's discretion is limited when considering a 
Motion to Set Aside, particularly when the merits have not been fully considered. Under 
such circumstances, and under such limited discretion, the district court abused its 
discretion in not setting aside the default judgment. 
Secondly, the court erred when it issued its order subsequent to the January 8, 
2008 evidentiary hearing. Based upon the testimony of Appellee, Appellee's friend, and 
Appellee's husband, the court awarded medical expenses and pain and suffering of 
$66,213.07. The Appellee testified that the Appellants admitted liability immediately 
after the incident occurred. The district court specifically cited this testimony as a 
Finding of Fact supporting its award of $66,213.07. In doing so, the district court 
violated UCA 78-14-18, which specifically makes inadmissible 
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"any unsworn statement, affirmation, gesture, or conduct made 
to the patient by the defendant . . . if it: (a) expresses: (i) apology, 
sympathy, commiseration, condolence, or compassion; or (ii) a general 
sense of benevolence; or (b) describes: (i) the sequence of events 
relating to the unanticipated outcome of medical care; (ii) the 
significance of events; or (iii) both." 
By admitting and relying on testimony in direct violation of UCA 78-14-18, and 
in relying on the same, court abused its discretion. 
Thirdly, the court erred in awarding damages in a medical malpractice case 
without relying on expert evidence to establish reasonableness and necessity, which is 
required under Utah law. Jensen v IHC Hospitals, Inc., 82 P.3d 1076, 1095-1096 (Utah 
2003|). 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED 
THE APPELLANT'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE. 
Appellee's Motion for Summary Disposition attempted to frame the issue on 
appeal as to whether the district court abused its discretion in entering the default. That 
is not the issue. The issue on appeal is whether the court abused its discretion in 
rejecting the Appellant's Motion to Set Aside, which was filed 10 days after the default 
had been entered. The distinction is important because the court's discretion in entering 
the default differed from the discretion it had in rejecting the Motion to Set Aside. 
While the court may have been justified in entering the default, the court was not 
justified in rejecting the Motion to Set Aside after being apprised of information making 
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the default inappropriate. Specifically, the Appellant justified her previous failures 
which had led to the default. It was an abuse of discretion for the district court to ignore 
this information and refuse to set aside the default. 
A. Under the Circumstances, the Appellant's Acts Were "Reasonably 
Justified," Warranting Vacating the Default. 
Under Utah law, default judgments should be allowed to stand only under certain 
circumstances. Most importantly, the court has explained that default judgments: 
are not favored in the law, especially where a party has timely responded 
with challenging pleadings. When that has been done some caution should 
be observed to see that the party is not taken advantage of. Speaking 
generally about such problems, it is to be kept in mind that access to the 
courts for the protection of rights and the settlement of disputes is one of 
the most important factors in the maintenance of a peaceable and well-
ordered society. . . . 
The uniformally acknowledged policy of the law is to accord litigants the 
opportunity for a hearing on the merits, where that can be done without 
serious injustice to the other party. To that end, the courts are generally 
indulgent toward the setting aside of default judgments where there is a 
reasonable justification or excuse for the defendant's failure to appear, and 
where timely application is made to set it aside. Consistent with the 
objective just stated, where there is doubt about whether a default should 
be set aside, the doubt should be resolved in favor of doing so, to the end 
that each party may have an opportunity to present his side of the 
controversy and that there be a resolution in accordance with law and 
justice. 
Interstate Excavating Inc., v Agla Dev. Corp., 611 P.2d 369, 371(Utah 1980)(Emphasis 
added). According to the Utah Supreme Court, the Appellant was required to meet two 
requirements after the default was entered. First, the Appellant was required to timely 
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respond by challenging the default. Second, the Appellant must show, in that challenge, 
a reasonable justification to excuse the failure to act which led to the default. The 
Appellant met both of these requirements. Appellant filed a timely Motion to Set Aside. 
The bases for the Motion to Set Aside "reasonably justified]" the Appellant's failures, 
and thereby created a doubt as to the appropriateness of the default. The court abused its 
discretion in not setting aside the default. 
Utah courts have explained that a court's discretion to deny a motion to set aside 
is more limited than its discretion to grant it, particularly where the movant's case has 
not been fully considered. Lund v Brown, 11 P.3d 277 (Utah 2000)(citing 11 Wright et 
al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 2857, at 257-58 (2d ed. 1995)(stating, "There is 
much more reason for liberality in reopening a judgment when the merits of the case 
never have been considered than there is when the judgment comes after a full trial on 
the merits. Based on the remedial nature of Rule 60(b), the discretion of the district 
court to deny a motion for relief is limited.")). The district court abused its discretion in 
refusing to set aside the default, despite the fact that 1) the merits of the case had never 
been considered, 2) a timely challenge had been filed, and 3) there was "reasonable 
justification" for "doubt" as to whether the default should be set aside. 
Finally, Utah courts are generally "lenient with pro se litigants. Individuals have a 
right to represent themselves without being compelled to seek professional assistance. 
Where they are largely strangers to the legal system, courts are understandably loath to 
sanction them for a procedural misstep here or there." Lundahl v. Quinn, 67 P.3d 1000, 
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1002 (2003). The Appellant had been acting pro se since August 2007. Her Answer 
was stricken by the court in September 2007. As a stranger to the legal system, the court 
should have been lenient with the Appellant's failure to respond. Instead of affording 
such leniency, the court struck the Answer and entered the default. 
i. The Appellant's Challenge was Timely 
The Motion to Set Aside challenged the court's default arguing that the 
Appellant's failures to act in discovery were justified. The final judgment was amended 
on February 5, 2008. The Motion to Set Aside was timely filed on February 19, 2008, 
10 working days after it was entered. 
ii. "Reasonable Justification" Was Shown Through Evidence of 
Counsel Misconduct or Negligence. 
The Motion to Set Aside should have been granted because it was "reasonably 
justified]" by the circumstances, as evidenced by the district court's own prior ruling. In 
addition to the fact that the Appellant had been acting pro se for only a matter of weeks 
before the court struck the Answer and entered her default, the failure to provide 
discovery was overwhelmingly the consequence of prior counsel's failure to act. Such 
is not merely an allegation, but is established by the district court's own ruling in August 
2007. The district court found that, at a minimum, Appellant's prior counsel violated 
the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct by failing to comply with the courts orders and 
rules (Rule 3.4(c)), failure to respond to discovery (Rule 3.4(d)), and engaging in 
conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice (Rule 8.4(d)). (Rec. 511). 
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Counsel misconduct or negligence has been held sufficient to justify setting aside 
a default. See Interstate Excavating Inc. Based on this established case law and the fact 
that it was Appellant's prior counsel that was overwhelmingly at fault for the discovery 
failures, there was "reasonable justification" for the Appellant's failures. Interstate 
Excavating Inc., at 371. The "reasonable justification" was sufficient to at least 
establish "doubt about whether a default should be set aside." Id. Under Utah law, that 
doubt should have been resolved by setting aside the default judgment. Id. 
The existence of "reasonable justification" sufficient to establish "doubt" is 
particularly apparent, as explained above, in light of the facts that 1) the court's 
discretion is limited when considering motions to set aside, 2) the Appellant was a pro 
se litigant when the default was entered, and 3) the merits of the case had not been 
reached. Under such circumstances, the rejection of the Motion to Set Aside was an 
abuse of discretion. 
II. THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY VIOLATING UCA 78-14-
18. 
The evidentiary hearing held on January 8, 2008 and involved testimony from 
Appellee. Appellee testified as follows: 
Q. Okay. So tell us what happened that day. 
A. . . . I went to the clinic for my scheduled treatment. Linda 
[Appellee] was really busy that day. . . . she said she was gonna 
have Renette start me, get me ready. 
Q. And who is Renette? 
A. Her daughter. 
Q. Okay. Did she start you? 
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She prepped me and then Linda said she wanted her to start the 
laser treatment so she did, in fact, start the treatments. 
Okay. Then, then what happened? 
It was, it was burning a little bit. . . and Renette did my left arm and 
started on my right arm and then Linda came in and took over. 
Okay, and then after Linda took over, what happened? 
She retreated my right arm. . . I told her it was hurting. . . I told her 
Renette already did it. . . 
Okay. Then what happened? 
Then she moved on to start treating my legs. My arms started to get 
really red. . . I was in a lot of pain. . . and my left aim started to 
blister. . . Renette wasn't in the room at the time because she'd left 
when Linda took over. Renetter came back in and looked at my 
arms and said, "Oh my God, did I do that?" And Linda said, "No, I 
did." 
(January 18, 2008 Transcript, pgs. 10-11). Based upon this specific testimony of 
Appellee, the court awarded $66,213.07 against the Defendant. (Rec. 648). This 
testimony evidence, however, is conversation between the Appellee and Appellant in 
which Appellee claims Appellant admitted liability for medical malpractice. UCA 78-
14-18 specifically makes inadmissible "any unsworn statement, affirmation, gesture, or 
conduce made to the patient by the defendant . . . if it: (a) expresses: (i) apology, 
sympathy, commiseration, condolence, or compassion; or (ii) a general sense of 
benevolence; or (b) describes: (i) the sequence of events relating to the unanticipated 
outcome of medical care; (ii) the significance of events; or (iii) both." By admitting 
such conversation as evidence, by including it as a Finding of Fact, and by relying on it 
as a basis for the award, the district court acted in direct violation of UCA 78-14-18. 









III. THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY FAILING TO RELY ON 
EXPERT TESTIMONY. 
Under Utah law "to prove medical malpractice, a plaintiff must establish '(1) the 
standard of care by which the (physician's) conduct is to be measured, (2) breach of that 
standard by the (physician),' (3) injury that was proximately caused by the physician's 
negligence, and (4) damages. Jensen v IHC Hospitals, Inc., 82 P.3d 1076, 1095-1096 
(Utah 2003). Further, "[u]nless 'the propriety of the treatment received is within the 
common knowledge and experience of the layman,' the plaintiff is required to prove the 
standard of care through an expert witness who is qualified to testify about the 
standard." Additionally, the subsequent determination of damages must likewise be 
based upon expert testimony, rather than mere speculation of lay persons. Sohm v. 
Dixie Eye Center, 166 P.3d 614 (Utah App. 2007). "Because of the complex issues 
involved in a . . . medical malpractice case," the plaintiff is required to prove the 
standard of care and proximate cause through expert testimony." Id., at 619. Only after 
expert evidence has been introduced to establish the standard of care and proximate 
cause may the matter be submitted for the determination of damages. See Beard v. K-
Mart Corp., 12 P.3d 1215, 1019-1020 (Utah App. 2000). "Without the required expert 
medical opinion linking the injury to the necessity of the [medical treatment], a jury 
would simply be speculating about a linkage that is beyond its knowledge and 
experience. The expert medical testimony merely established a chronological 
relationship between the accident and her symptoms. No expert medical testimony was 
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received that the [medical treatment] w[as] necessitated by her accident." Id. at 1021. 
Lacking the necessary expert evidence, the damages award in the case at bar was purely 
speculative. Medical expenses which were ordered as part of the Judgment were 
hearsay, incompetent and should have been excluded. 
The Appellee failed to provide any expert evidence upon which the court could 
find that the standard of care had been breached, and consequently, the damages 
awarded were purely speculative. By issuing its order in the complete absence of 
required expert evidence, the district court abused its discretion and committed error. 
CONCLUSION 
This matter has never been heard on the merits. The court entered an order 
striking the Answer and entering default against the Appellant at a time the Appellant 
was representing herself pro-se for the first time during litigation. The delay in 
answering discovery, which led to the striking of the Answer and the entering of the 
default, was the result of prior counsel's misconduct. Such was even formally 
recognized by the district court. Under such circumstances, the Appellant's failure to 
respond to discovery was reasonably justified, and therefore, sufficient to make the 
appropriateness of the default doubtful. To refuse to set aside the default under such 
circumstances was an abuse of discretion. 
The court also erred in basing its judgment upon testimony that the Appellant 
immediately admitted liability for the alleged injury. Reliance on such testimony 
directly contradicts UCA 78-14-18. 
-12-
Finally, the court incorrectly entered judgment without expert testimony as 
required under Utah law. There was no evidence upon which the court court could find 
that the standard of care had been breached, and no evidence that would make damages 
anything other than pure speculation. 
DATED THIS f / day of September, 2008. 
PLANT, CHRISTENSEN & KANELL, PC 
Theodore E. Kanell 
Attorney for Defendant, Linda R. Hensley 
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ADDENDUM 
No addendum is needed. 
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